Empirical evidence suggest that in many situations, firm-internal profit and productivity measures are important determinants of workers' effort decision. We demonstrate that the efficiency wage hypothesis based on such an internal reference perspective implies substantial wage rigidity in general equilibrium. By contrast, efficiency wage models based on the conventional external reference assumption fail to generate such rigidity.
Introduction
Why don't firms lower wages in the face of depressed labor demand conditions? This question has been at the heart of macroeconomic debates since Keynes [1936] . Yet, as Hall [2003a] argues in a recent paper, "...a compelling model [that generates a fall in labor demand without a counterfactual fall in productivity] has eluded theorists to date". To students of efficiency wage theories, Hall's assertion may come as a surprise given that such models were precisely developed to provide a response to that question. The efficiency wage hypothesis proposes that firms refrain from large wage reductions because the thus realized cost savings would be more than offset by the resulting decrease in labor productivity. 1 This apparently robust logic for wage rigidity has proven fragile, however, once the models are embedded in a general equilibrium context.
In this paper, we show that the failure to generate wage rigidity is not a property of the efficiency wage hypothesis itself but rather follows from the usual interpretation given to the reference compensation level to which workers compare their salary when deciding on their work effort and thus on productivity. In conformity with Keynes' [1936] relative wage hypothesis, conventional models have adopted an external interpretation to this reference wage, based on the following motivation:
workers appraise their wage in light of the remuneration they could obtain if they were not under contract with their current employer. One of the most prominent exponents of this view is the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984] .
The reason why efficiency wage models with external wage reference fail to generate wage rigidity is that in general equilibrium, the external benchmark may be, and typically will be, very sensitive to aggregate shocks. As a result, actual wages may be flexible over the business cycle simply because the comparison remuneration is as well. Stated otherwise, the essence of the efficiency wage perspective is that wages are rigid only to the extent that the reference wage is. In the external reference perspective, general equilibrium effects imply that this is not usually the case. 2 This observation leads us to scrutinize the validity of the conventional external reference interpretation. While intuitive in theory, we argue that in many labor market situations, the internal view appears to be an at least as relevant character- 1 The link between effort and productivity finds different alternative or complementary rationalizations in the multiple variants of the efficiency wage model. See Yellen [1984] or Katz [1986] for surveys. 2 Danthine and Donaldson [1990] first pointed out this result in a business cycle context.
ization than the external view of how workers and managers behave in reality. Our assessment is based on three kinds of evidence. First, micro-based estimations for several countries suggest that firm profits and productivity are a significant predictor of wage setting, even in sectors where union bargaining power is weak. Second, a host of field studies corroborate that the firm's ability to pay, firm-specific salary traditions as well as workers past wages are important reference points for workers. But why should workers be concerned with such internal references rather than earnings opportunities external to the firm? Field studies offer two answers. On the one hand, information about outside salary options to use them as the benchmark for their effort decision. Bewley [2002] specifically concludes his survey with the statement that "...many workers do not seem to use pay rates at other firms as ref-
erence wages, for they know too little about them." On the other hand, individuals in many situations seem to be concerned with the fairness of a certain wage offer, where fairness depends on the employer's earnings situation and how big of a share of the "total pie" the workers traditionally received in the form of compensation.
Third, experiments tailored to simulate labor relations where effort is not enforcable result in market clearing wages that are considerably higher than reservation wages because individuals understand the negative effect of inadequate rent sharing on effort.
We pursue the implications of this evidence in a static general equilibrium setting, using a popular reduced-form effort function proposed by Akerlof [1982] . We demonstrate that if the reference wage is made dependent on firm-internal measures of earnings per worker, the efficiency wage hypothesis is capable of delivering extreme endogenous wage rigidity in general equilibrium. Wages in the same model would adjust much more in response to aggregate shocks under the conventional assumption that the reference wage is a function of economy-wide labor market variables that are external to the firm.
The intuition behind the difference in results is simple. Under the external assumption, the wage reference of workers is positively related to the aggregate wage, the employment level as well as other labor market variables such as unemployment benefits. Hence, when firms reduce employment in response to a labor demand shift, there is a general equilibrium fall of the wage reference. This makes it optimal for firms to lower their wages. Put graphically, the firms' wage setting curve in general equilibrium implies a steep positive relationship between employment and wages. As a result, shifts in labor demand cause wages to comove excessively with employment. By contrast, in the internal reference case and under the assumption that the marginal productivity of labor is decreasing, earnings per unit of labor and therefore employment are negatively related to the wage reference. Hence, the wage setting curve is downward-sloping and changes in overall productivity shift both the labor demand curve and the wage setting curve. This means that aggregate shocks potentially have a large effect on employment while leaving real wages approximately unchanged.
The internal reference perspective as well as the evidence surveyed in this paper accord well with the spirit of the partial gift exchange or fairness view of efficiency wages initially put forth by Akerlof [1982] . However, his model as well as promising extensions by Collard and De la Croix [2000] and by the present authors (Danthine and Kurmann [2004] ) are uniformly based on a reduced-form formulation of the effort function rather than being derived from an explicit description of individual behavior. As such, these contributions are meant as an illustration rather than a systematic exploration of the effects of fairness considerations in labor relations.
In the second part of the paper, we therefore propose a more structural partial gift exchange model that (i) is broadly consistent with experimental evidence on reciprocity in labor relations; and (ii) can be easily integrated into a modern general equilibrium macroeconomic framework. Building on Rabin's [1993] introduction of fairness into game theory, workers in our model face an explicit trade-off between the material disutility of providing effort and the psychological benefit of reciprocating the gift of the firm's wage with a gift in terms of effort. The reference point to which workers compare the wage in their evaluation of the firm's gift is a weighted average of the firm's productivity per worker and the worker's reservation wage. This can be interpreted as the solution to a repeated Nash bargaining game. Optimal behavior by the worker results in a condition for effort that is similar to Akerlof's reducedform effort function, but that is derived from structural underpinnings. Firms, modeled as monopolistic competitors, take this effort condition into account when maximizing profits.
The theory we develop has several important implications. First, our model implies strong endogenous wage rigidity and amplified general equilibrium responses of real quantities to technology shocks (given flexible prices) and demand shocks (given fixed prices). The mechanism behind this result is the same as in Akerlof's reduced-form model with internal reference: when firms decrease employment, earnings per worker increase, which raises the worker's reference wage. Firms thus find it suboptimal to lower wages and, consequently, they adapt to shocks mostly through changes in employment.
Second, effort in our model is procyclical in the sense that it is negatively linked to the markup of marginal cost over prices. Whenever the markup falls (as we observe in demand-driven expansions; see for example Rotemberg and Woodford [1999] ), firms' earnings per worker fall. This decreases the workers' reference wage.
Firms take advantage of this fall in the reservation wage partly by eliciting an increase in effort and partly by lowering their wage offer. Our model thus proposes an alternative explanation to Burnside and Eichenbaum's [1996] labor hoarding story for the procyclicality of effort. By contrast, Akerlof's reduced form model has the strong implication that equilibrium effort is constant. Furthermore, the countercyclical wage response with respect to the demand shock is consistent with the findings of a number of econometric studies using structural vector autoregressions.
Third, our model predicts that the natural rate of employment is high under the following economic conditions: unemployment benefits (or more generally, reservation wages) are low, aversion to effort and aversion to consumption fluctuations on the part of workers are low, the degree of competition among firms is high.
The static nature of our general equilibrium analysis neglects intertemporal wage comparisons as a possible determinant of work effort. This stands in contrast to a number of field research and psychological studies, which stress that workers' wage aspiration are often shaped by past wages. These empirical observations, however, elude the question of why workers should be concerned with wage changes since individuals in static labor market experiments care for how total earnings are split.
We argue in the last part of the paper that our fairness-based model of efficiency wages offers a plausible explanations for this puzzle. Workers indeed care about their share of total earnings. In addition, however, the reservation wage of workers is a second important determinant of the reference wage. This reservation wage typically depends on unemployment benefits and / or the worker's propensity for habit persistence. Both explain why past wages should enter into the reference wage and thus the firm's wage setting decision.
Our model also implies that employment increases whenever workers' perception about productivity falls below the actual level and vice versa. This mechanism is at the heart of many reduced-form explanations for unemployment and inflation dynamics, such as Blanchard [2000] or Ball and Moffitt [2001] . Yet all these studies are silent on the reasons why such a link between productivity and wages exists.
Our paper represents a first step towards bridging the gap between these empirical contributions and a more structural theory of wage determination.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the importance of the distinction between external and internal wage references with the help of a standard reduced-form efficiency wage model. Section 3 surveys the empirical evidence on this issue. Section 4 develops an explicit reciprocity-based model of efficiency wages and explores its implications in a static general equilibrium context. Section 5 proposes an extension of our perspective to a dynamic context. Section 6 concludes.
Internal vs. external wage references: theory
In this section, we present a simple reduced-form model of efficiency wages that is inspired by Akerlof [1982] . We explore the model's implications for both the case where the wage reference is external and the case where the wage reference is internal.
Generalities
Consider an economy with identical workers and identical firms. Firms produce output using effective labor en and technology
with f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0 as usual. 3 Work effort e cannot be observed directly but workers provide effort according to the following relation
which we call the Effort Condition (EC). 4 The variable w denotes the workers' real wage per unit of labor, and w r stands for some reference wage level in light of which workers evaluate their compensation. The larger the markup of w over w r , the more effort the typical worker is willing to provide. In his original paper, Akerlof [1982] motivated this functional form as the result of partial gift exchange between workers and firms. However, the same condition could also be thought of as the reduced-form consequence of a neoclassical efficiency wage hypothesis such as the shirking model proposed by Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984] . 3 We will abstract from capital or other inputs to production. However, the ensuing analysis could be readily extended in this dimension. 4 All the results below hold for a more general formulation e = e(w, wr) as well.
w r . At this stage we remain as general as possible and include the following arguments w r = w r (w,n, w min , y/n),
wherew is the aggregate wage, n is the aggregate employment level, w min is the reservation wage level, y/n is output per worker.
Under the external wage reference view, workers compare their salary to the compensation they could expect to receive were they not employed with their current firm. Then,w represents the wage workers obtain if rehired by another (identical) firm with ew < 0;n denotes the probability of reemployment after leaving the firm with en < 0; and w min can be thought of as the level of unemployment benefits the worker obtains if he is not re-hired (e w min < 0). Output per worker, or alternatively the firm's gross revenue situation, does not enter into the workers' consideration;
i.e. e y/n = 0.
By contrast, the internal reference view postulates that workers compare their salary to their firm's gross profit per employee. The more workers yield for the firm in terms of output, the more they expect to be compensated in return; i.e.
e y/n < 0. On the other hand, outside opportunities do not enter into the workers' calculation (ew = 0, en = 0) except in the form of their reservation wage: e w min < 0.
Both the external and the internal reference views can be motivated by a variety of arguments. For now, however, we abstain from providing a justification and simply contrast the implications of each of these assumptions.
Firms understand that workers provide effort according to (2) . Firms therefore face two decisions with regards to their workforce: the amount of labor n they want to hire; and the salary w per unit of labor they want to pay. Cost minimization yields the first-order conditions
where ψ denotes real marginal cost, or the inverse of the firm's markup of nominal marginal cost over price. 5 With the assumed technology, we can rewrite f e = f n n/e 5 In perfect competition, nominal marginal cost must equal the price level and hence ψ = 1.
and express condition (3) as
where ε e,n = ∂e/∂n * n/e denotes the elasticity of effort with respect to the firm's labor input. This equation determines labor demand. In the external reference case, ∂e/∂n = 0 since e y/n = 0 and firms considerw andn as exogenous. Then the employment decision depends on a standard condition stating that at the margin, the marginal product of labor (multiplied by the real marginal cost) is equated to the wage rate. According to the internal reference perspective, however, ∂e/∂n > 0.
In that case, the marginal condition is to equate the wage rate to the marginal product of labor (modified by the real marginal cost) augmented by the elasticity of effort to employment. This leads to the following proposition 6
Proposition 1
The internal wage reference view of efficiency wages leads to overemployment in the sense that, ceteris paribus and in particular for a given wage, firms hire more labor than if the considered reference compensation level is external.
The intuition behind this proposition is straightforward: firms understand that hiring more labor reduces output per worker and thus the workers' wage reference.
A larger workforce therefore reduces the wage needed to elicit a given level of effort. This mechanism is similar to the one at work in Stole and Zwiebel's (1996) framework of intrafirm bargaining. In their model, workers are assumed to enjoy a fixed amount of bargaining power and labor productivity is taken to be the firm's threat point in the wage negociation. An increase in labor therefore reduces the negociated wage, a fact that leads firms to hire more labor. The second first-order condition (4) is standard in efficiency wage models: firms set the marginal cost of raising w by an incremental unit equal to the the increase
In situations of monopolistic competition, however, firms charge prices as a markup over nominal marginal cost, i.e. ψ < 1. Hence, ψ is a measure of the degree of competition in the economy. 6 ∂e/∂n > 0 can be shown using the implicit function theorem. 7 We thank Etienne Wasmer for pointing out this similarity.
in productivity resulting from the increase in effort induced by the increase in w.
Note that in both the external and the internal reference case, we assume that the firms takew and w min as exogenous.
It is useful to combine the two first-order conditions to obtain (after some rearrangement) ε e,w − ε e,n = 1,
where ε e,w = ∂e/∂w * w/e > 0 is the elasticity of workers' effort with respect to their wage. We call (6) the Modified Solow Condition (MSC). For the external reference case, the MSC reduces to Solow's (1979) original condition ε e,w = 1: the wage rate is optimal if at the margin a 1% increase in wage implies a 1% increase in effort. Then, the marginal wage increase exactly pays for itself in terms of increased output. This condition is almost omnipresent in current efficiency wage models and demonstrates the ubiquity of the external reference perspective in the literature.
For the internal reference case, however, the traditional Solow condition no longer holds because a marginal wage increase has an additional effect on effort. This is because the marginal decrease in employment it entails has itself an impact of effort.
The latter is negative. Thus, ceteris paribus, the last wage increase warranted in the external reference case would not pay for itself in the internal reference context.
Hence, our second proposition:
Proposition 2 Ceteris paribus, firms set lower wages if the wage reference is internal than if it is external.
Note that this proposition 2 depends on the property that the elasticity of effort with respect to wage is decreasing, a property that is established in the appendix.
Care must be exercised in making use of Proposition 2, however. This is because the ceteris paribus condition will not typically hold. It is the case indeed that the definition of w r affects the value of ε e,w and ε e,n .
In equilibrium, both the EC and the MSC need to hold. Combining the two equations and assuming that e = e(w, ...) implied by the MSC is unique, we can substitute out effort to obtain an equilibrium equation for the wage. We call this expression the "wage setting curve". It replaces the labor supply equation of standard Walrasian models of the labor market and determines the labor market equilibrium together with the labor demand condition (5) and the production function. difference between employment as implied by the FWF at the equilibrium wage and the amount of labor supplied at the same wage determines unemployment. Figure   1 depicts this equilibrium graphically. 9 
A model with external wage references
To be more concrete, let us assume a log-linear technology, y = A(en) α and follow
Akerlof in defining the (external) reference wage as
A stands for the level of the technology,w is the economy-wide average wage,n is the aggregate employment level, and b is the level of unemployment benefits, which we take as the individual's reservation wage. According to this formulation, workers appraise their wage with respect to aggregate labor market conditions because they are concerned about the remuneration they could expect to obtain if they were not under contract with their current employer. The reference wage is thus the geometric average with the employment raten and the unemployment rate 1 −n naturally corresponding to the probabilities of earningw or b, respectively.
Most existing models of efficiency wages espouse such an external reference view, which is closely related to Keynes' [1936] relative wage theory. 10 Under this definition for w r , the labor demand and the Solow condition (SC) take the form
Combining the EC with this expression for the SC, Akerlof's reduced-form model implies that the optimal wage (from the perspective of the employer) is a constant markup over the reference wage w r
Hence, effort is a constant (in the sense of being unrelated to the equilibrium level of variables such as employment or the markup)
Optimal effort does not depend on other macro-economic variables such as unemployment benefits, nor on the markups firms charge over marginal cost.
Equation (9) appears to suggest that this model can generate strong wage rigidity: as long as w r remains relatively constant with respect to aggregate shocks, the wage firms charge will stay more or less unchanged. This justification for why efficiency wages lead to wages that fluctuate relatively little has been proposed, for example, by Yellen [1990] .
However, the problem is that (9) is not an equilibrium equation. In equilibrium, this reference wage w r may be, and typically will be, strongly affected by aggregate shocks. This is because the only reason for firms to hold their wages constant is if all other firms keep theirs constant. Even if they were to do it, employment would decrease in the face of a negative shock, and thus the wage reference would decrease.
But then firms decrease their own wage and if all do it, nothing prevents from all adjusting relatively flexibly. For that reason, the external reference model fails to generate sluggish wage movements in general equilibrium, a point made early on by Danthine and Donaldson (1990) in a real business cycle context that we can now make formally with the help of our reduced form model.
The homogenous nature of firms and workers implies that in equilibrium,w = w andn = n. Hence, (9) becomes
which is the wage setting curve that determines the aggregate labor market equilibrium together with the labor demand (7). This is depicted graphically in Figure 2 .
Note that full employment is not attainable: as n approaches 1 (full employment), the firm will want to increase its wage without bound, which cannot be an equilibrium since the labor demand stipulates a negative relationship between w and n.
Using the wage setting curve, let us compute the elasticity of the real wage with respect to employment ∂w ∂n
The last equality follows from the condition that unemployment benefits are a fraction of the salary; i.e. b = ρw with 0 < ρ < 1 being defined as the replacement ratio. This elasticity is positive and serves as a good measure of real wage rigidity:
the lower ∂w ∂n n w , the less wages need to react for a certain response in employment. Surprisingly, it does not depend on the calibration of any of the reduced form parameters of the effort function (a 0 , a 1 , γ), nor on other structural parameters (α, ψ, A). Given that unemployment is roughly between 5% and 10% in most indus- Thus, even in the "most favorable" scenario (n = 0.9 and ρ = 0.65), wages move almost four times as much as employment: the Akerlof model with external references fails to deliver substantial real wage rigidity.
A model with internal wage references
We now consider the case of an internal wage reference coupled with the same reduced-form effort function as used above. We define
This specification can be interpreted as follows. When deciding on effort, workers compare their wage to a weighted average of some maximum and some minimum compensation level. The maximum is defined as the amount a firm can pay to its workers before going out of business. Since there are no other costs but wages in our context, this amount equals y/n. For the minimum compensation level, we take the worker's reservation wage, which we will assume to equal unemployment benefits b.
If the offered wage was lower, the worker would decline the offer. 11
The optimal labor and wage decisions now become more complex because the firm takes account of the consequences that changes in n have on the wage reference and thus on effort. Specifically, ∂e/∂n > 0 and the labor demand, respectively the MSC become
We again refer the reader to the appendix for details. Combining the MSC and the EC as before we obtain the wage setting curve
We observe that optimal wage is again a constant over the reference wage and thus, as in the external case, optimal effort is constant:
Note that the last expression when compared with the similar equation in the external reference case, condition (10) , implies that the equilibrium effort level is lower in the internal reference perspective. Note also that in the present case, there is no difference between the above wage setting curve for the firm and the corresponding relation in general equilibrium. Furthermore, (14) implies a relationship between w and n that is fundamentally different from the one obtained in the external case: the higher is employment, the lower is output per worker y/n (since effort is always constant) and thus, the lower is the reference wage. This in turn means that, ceteris paribus, firms can set their wage lower in order to elicit the optimal effort level.
11 Alternatively, we could have considered some mandated minimum wage level the firm is required to pay. As long as this minimum is constant, however, the conclusions reached below remain unchanged.
the equilibrium which is depicted in Figure 3 .
Comparative statics
To back up our intuition with numerical results, we compare the implications of internal versus external references by means of comparative statics. First, we compute the general equilibrium response of the each of the models to a shock in technology A, assuming that prices are completely flexible. This is a neoclassical situation where the equilibrium is fully supply determined. Second, we consider a change in demand y under the assumption that prices are completely fixed. This is a New
Keynesian situation, where y is exogenous and the markup 1/ψ becomes endogenous since firms are supposed to match any demand by adjusting production accordingly.
All of the comparative statics are calculated relative to a benchmark equilibrium.
This equilibrium is the solution to the system formed by the condition for optimal effort, the wage setting equation, labor demand, the production function and the constraint that unemployment benefits are a fixed fraction of the wage b = ρw. In the simulation, we then leave b constant at its equilibrium value (consequently, the replacement ratio ρ will vary).
The calibration we choose for the benchmark equilibrium is as follows: n = 0.95, A = 1, α = 0.6, ρ = 0.5, ψ = 0.9 (a markup 1/ψ of 11%), γ = 0.5, a1 = 1. In the external case, the parameter a 0 is then pinned down by a combination of ρ, γ and a 1 . The appendix explains the details of this calculation as well as the computation of the comparative statics. Given this calibration, we obtain an equilibrium labor income share of wn/y = αψ = 0.54. In the U.S., labor income share has averaged roughly the same value over the post-World-War-II sample.
Calibration of the benchmark equilibrium in the internal case requires setting one extra parameter because the weight of the reference wage ϕ is now a parameter rather than an aggregate variable as in the external case (n). We leave all the parameters identical to the external case plus a 0 = 0.75. This implies a value of ϕ = 0.2 and a labor income share of wn/y = 0.586. 12 
Flexible price technology shock
The second row of Table 1 shows the flexible price response of the external reference model to a 1% decrease in A. Firms react by decreasing both employment and wages so that the labor demand condition (7) holds again. However, the response in employment (−0.08%) is much smaller than the wage response (−0.97%), which is almost as large as the productivity shock itself. Figure 4a displays these responses.
As a result, production decreases by hardly more than the shock itself (−1.04%) and labor productivity drops substantially (−0.97). As illustrated above, the small labor response is due to the fact that in equilibrium, the reference wage declines with the decrease in w and n. Hence, firms need to decrease their wage by a lot for it to remain a fixed fraction of the reference wage as stipulated by the optimal wage setting condition (11) , so that effort remains at its optimal constant value.
The second row of Table 2 shows the response to a 1% decrease in A for the internal reference model. Surprisingly, both w and y/n remain unchanged, while employment and output decrease by −2.48%. The internal reference model thus exhibits extreme rigidity in real wages and labor productivity in response to a productivity shock, while generating substantially amplified responses in real quantities! Figure 4b displays this situation.
The intuition behind the constancy of the wage is the following. Consider the labor demand (12) and the wage setting curve (14) . In both equations, the wage depends on labor productivity y/n, which in turn is positively related to A. In addition, the reference wage depends on the reservation value b and thus, the wage in (14) depends on b. Since we keep b constant after the decrease in A, the only way the firm can satisfy both the labor demand and the wage setting curve is to adjust n in such a way that both y/n and w remain at their original levels.
Fixed price demand shock
The third row of Table 1 shows the response of the external reference model to a −1% decrease in demand under the assumption that prices are completely fixed.
Firms match this drop in demand by reducing production. Since wages are set such that effort is constant, the drop in effective labor must come from a decrease in labor. As in the case of a technology shock, the ensuing decrease in aggregate employment implies that the reference wage decreases (again we keep unemployment benefits constant). This in turn means that firms need to decrease the wage to prevent a (suboptimal) decrease in the supply of effort. But this decrease in firms'
wages pushes down the reference wage even further. It is thus unsurprising that the wage change necessary to induce the required increase in employment is very large: w decreases by more than 15% for an decrease in n of only 1.66%. Figure 5a illustrates this graphically. This large variation in the wage is accompanied by an equally large increase in the markup 1/ψ. 13 The response of the internal reference model to the 1% decrease in demand is very much different. As the third row of Table 2 displays, the decrease in labor needed for the reduction in production increases labor productivity y/n. But this means that the reference wage increases rather than decreases as in the external case. Hence, firms need to increase their wage (by 0.13%) in order to keep effort at its optimal constant level. Under the fixed price assumption, the internal reference model therefore generates countercyclical real wages in response to demand shocks, which can be interpreted as an extreme form of wage rigidity. 14 In sum, the external reference view cannot generate sluggish wage dynamics in general equilibrium. For reasonable calibrations, the reference wage strongly comoves with employment and aggregate shocks, thus forcing firms to adjust their wages substantially. By contrast, the reference wage is much more stable in the internal case and actually moves inversely with employment. Hence, wages are sluggish and negatively related to employment.
Internal vs. external references: empirical evidence
The strongly different implications of the internal reference view compared to the external reference view raise two important questions. What are the wage references that workers consider in reality? And if the internal view is relevant, what explains why workers are concerned by the firm's productivity situation?
We argue here that while external reference motives certainly can play a role (especially what the influence of unemployment measures is concerned), references internal to the firm in reality appear to be at least as important for workers' effort decision. Our assertion is based on three different types of empirical evidence:
micro-based estimations, field studies and experiments. We discuss each of them in 13 Note that in the case of a positive 1% demand shock, the response in the wage would be even larger (+38%). Hence, the external model displays substantial asymetry to shocks. By contrast, the comparative statics with respect to positive shocks are almost the same (except for the sign change) in the case of the internal reference model. 14 In Section 4, we return to discussing the countercyclical nature of real wages conditional on demand shocks.
turn.
Evidence from micro-based estimation
A substantial number of micro-based estimations provide evidence that firm's ability to pay plays a significant role in the determination of wages. The studies referenced above also control for different firm-, worker-and timespecific characteristics. In addition, most of these studies find that measures of unemployment negatively influence wages. This suggests that external considerations about labor market tightness do enter into the wage setting process. 16 Aside from the evidence about the influence of profits on wage setting, different studies investigate about the impact of sales per employee and value added. Of course, a positive relationship between profits / labor productivity and wages can be indicative of a variety of wage setting theories. Indeed, several of the above 15 Moreover, Nickell [1994] argues that the elasticities of lagged profits on wages that is estimated at around 0.04 in the above studies are underestimated due to weak instruments. Indeed, Abowd studies motivate their work with a union bargaining argument. The more general message to take away, however, is that internal wage references seem to matter at least as much as external references. Furthermore, internal references also play a role in sectors where union-related bargaining power is weak, thus suggesting that other explanations of the labor market are relevant. 18 
Evidence from field studies
The second source of evidence in favor of the internal reference perspective comes from field studies. Among the most important is Bewley [1999] who interviews a large number of company managers and labor leaders about wage determination. 19 According to the questioned individuals, workers seem to be mostly concerned about workers compare their salary to their own past wage, the pay of similar workers in the same firms and firm's ability to pay, as represented by profits and productivity. 20 Furthermore, most managers questioned by these studies as well as Bewley's answered that underbidding by new job applicants is largely refused even when such practice is relatively common, thus contradicting a major channel through which ref- The second explanation for the relevance of the internal reference perspective is psychological. The respondents in the different field studies consistently emphasize the importance of worker morale because of their impact on productivity. In particular, workers' effort decision is based to a large part on concerns about fairness, reflecting the need for internal equity and entitlement to a certain remuneration.
These observations concur with the study by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [1986] who conducted telephone surveys with randomly selected people about the fairness of firm actions in different profit situations. They find that a substantial proportion of individuals consider rent sharing (i.e. the principle of dual entitlement) as an important standard of fairness: workers are entitled to a reference salary, while firms are entitled to a reference profit. Accordingly, a wage reduction is more likely 21 A more heuristic but potentially no less relevant argument in favor of the incomplete information story comes from the burgeoning empirical literature on wage differentials. One of the main findings of this literature is that a large part of wage differentials are left unexplained by worker-specific or firm-specific characteristics but are due to the firm-worker specific match (see Mortensen [2003] for a survey). Under the assumption that workers cannot evaluate these firm-worker specific factors at other firms, this observation explains why pay rates at other companies are not used for comparison. 22 In interpreting their result, Agell and Bennmarker interestingly suggest that Keynes' relative wage theory may have been influenced by the fact that during his experience, unions in Great
Britain played a much more important role than they ever have in the United States.
to be judged unfair if it achieves a gain to the firm than if it averts a loss.
Evidence from experimental economics
The idea that workers' effort decision depends on their perception of fairness is largely consistent with evidence from laboratory experiments about reciprocity. The most important finding of these studies is that many individuals are willing to spend considerable resources to reward (punish) fair (unfair) behavior by others. 23 One of the experiments that is closest to the efficiency wage situation considered here is Fehr and Falk [1999] . 24 In their experiment, individuals are either assigned the role of a worker or a firm manager. The results show that if effort cannot be contracted in advance, the average wage chosen by the firm-type individuals is considerably higher than the reservation wage of the worker-type individual, even though competitive bidding should push the equilibrium pay down towards the worker-types' reservation wage. Indeed, workers in the experiment often try to underbid in order to obtain a job, but firm managers do not accept, consistent with the partial gift exchange intuition that firms understand the negative (suboptimal) effect of inadequate rent sharing on effort.
In sum, we reach two main conclusions from the surveyed evidence. First, internal references in many situations seems to be an important determinant of workers' effort. Firms take account of these considerations in their wage setting process.
Second, field studies and experimental economics suggest that an important reason for the relevance of internal references is the propensity of workers to reciprocate fair wages with an equally fair amount of effort. The fairness of a wage offer is a function of the firm's ability to pay, the worker's past wage as well as wages of other employees in the same firm holding similar jobs and responsibilities. 
A reciprocity-based model of efficiency wages with internal references
Motivated by the empirical evidence, we propose an efficiency wage model that is (i) built on an explicit formulation of reciprocity by workers; and (ii) incorporates internal references about the firm's ability to pay as an important determinant of fairness. In doing so, we attempt to remedy a number of caveats that apply to the stylized efficieny wage formulations above. First, the reduced-form nature of the models in Section 2 makes it difficult to judge the plausibility of the underlying assumptions. A second and related criticism is that important parameters values are devoid of any structural interpretation, which makes calibration arbitrary. Third, effort in both the internal and the external model is constant. This unfortunate property (in reality, there are good reasons to believe that effort is procyclical) is probably an artefact of the specific reduced-form effort function proposed by Akerlof that we aopted above.
Our explicit reciprocity-based model can be considered as a structural translation of Akerlof's [1982] partial gift exchange idea: if workers feel well treated in terms of their compensation, they are willing to reciprocate this "gift" by the firm with higher effort even though providing effort by itself is costly. Firms understand the worker's propensity to reciprocate and incorporate it into their wage setting decision. We develop our explicit reciprocity-based model in a static framework similar to the analysis in Section 2. Extensions into a dynamic context are discussed afterwards.
Workers
Workers are homogenous. Their preferences take the form
where u(c, ...) represents the utility derived from consumption-related arguments,
h(e) is the disutility incurred from providing effort and s(w, e) denotes the nonmaterialistic benefit of reciprocal behavior. Standard assumptions about u(c, ...) and h(e) hold: u c > 0, u cc < 0, h e > 0, h ee > 0. To focus our analysis on the supply of effort, we abstract from the disutility of leisure, assuming instead that each worker inelastically supplies one unit of labor.
The non-materialistic component of utility s(w, e) is defined as
where d(e, w) represents the gift of the worker towards the employer, and g(w, e) is the gift of the firm towards the worker (as perceived by the worker). We suppose that Under appropriate circumstances, the definition of utility implies that workers will supply positive effort because the disutility of effort is compensated by the satisfaction derived from reciprocating kind behavior in a bilateral relation in which individual effort contributes to the payoff of the other party. More precisely,
given separability of the work-related part, the optimal effort level is such that the marginal disutility of providing effort equals the marginal "psychological" benefit of reciprocating a positive (negative) gift by the firm with a positive (negative) gift in terms of effort 26
We label this equation the "Effort Condition" (EC) because, in the same way as in the case of the reduced-form formulation of Section 2, it spells out how much effort a worker is willing to supply in response to a certain wage offer. This time however, the EC is derived from an explicit structure outlining workers' optimizing behavior. Under the condition that h eee > 0, this condition can be shown to imply a concave relationship between effort and the wage. In other words, the wage has a marginally decreasing effect on effort as long as workers' materialistic preferences are sufficiently averse to providing effort.
The EC highlights a basic asymmetry about the interaction between the firm and the worker resulting from the fact that workers are (realistically) assumed to know the offered wage before deciding their effort level. This implies that in a sense the computation of the optimal (for the firm) wage takes place in the mind of the firm's manager: a wage offer is the result of his estimating how a potential offer will 25 See Rabin for further discussion. 26 The representative worker in this model is assumed to be infinitely small compared to the firm and therefore does not take into account the externality of effort on production and the gift by the firm; i.e. ge = 0.
be perceived by the worker and how the worker will react to the kindness of the firm thus manifested.
In specifying the gift of the worker and the gift of the firm, we follow Rabin one step further and derive d(e, w) and g(w, e) from material payoffs. That is, the firm's gift towards the worker is measured in (materialistic) utility terms as 27
g(e, w) = u(c(w), .) − u r (c(w max ), c(w min ), .) u(c(w max ), .) − u(c(w min ), .) .
The term u r (c(w max ), c(w min ), .) represents the reference payoff (measured in materialistic utility terms) that the worker considers as fair. As Rabin, we define it as a weighted average of the utilities that the maximum and the minimum wage level would allow
Likewise, the worker's gift towards the firm is measured in terms of the firm's profit per worker, which we specify as in Section 2 as y/n − w 28 d(w, e) = y(e, .) − y r (e max , e min , .) y(e max , .) − y(e min , .) .
The reference profit per worker, i.e. the profit level the worker considers as a fair is defined as before y r (e max , e min , .) = µy(e max , .) + (1 − µ)y(e min , .).
Given these definitions, the question of "what makes workers tick" boils down to
what workers take as their reference wage and what they consider to be a fair effort level. We consider the following specification. For the reference wage, we adopt the same internal perspective as in Section 2; i.e. we specify the maximum possible wage as the firm's zero profit condition w max = y/n, and the minimum admissible wage as the worker's unemployment benefits level w min = b (i.e. the reservation wage). The weight ϕ is taken as exogenous. We, however, show below how it can be calibrated by constraining unemployment benefits to be a constant replacement ratio ρ of wages (i.e. ρ = b/w). For the bounds on effort, we assume that e min = 0, which is consistent with the specification of the materialistic disutility of effort. In 27 We can neglect the h(e) terms in this calculations because they enter separately into the materialistic part of the worker's utility. 28 Note that similar to the definition of g(w, e), the term w drops out because it enters separably into the profit function of the firm.
turn, we set both maximum effort and the weight µ to some arbitrary constants.
The value of these constants does not affect the implications of the model. Finally, we assume that consumption is the only argument entering u(c, .) with
where γ < 1 is the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion; the disutility of effort takes the form
where we set θ ≥ 2 such as to ensure concavity of the EC; and technology is loglinear in efficient labor as before
with 0 < α ≤ 1.
Given this specification, the gift of the worker towards the firm becomes
Deriving the firm's gift towards the worker does not follow as easily since wages do not directly enter the utility function. Hence, we need to take a stand about how wages affect consumption. For now, we simply assume that consumption is proportional to the salary; i.e. u(c(w), .) ∝ u(w, ..) = 1 γ w γ . 29 Under this assumption, the gift of the firm becomes
Hence, the reference wage perceived as fair by workers can be viewed as the outcome of a repeated Nash bargaining with y/n being the firm's threat point, b being the worker's threat point, and ϕ representing "established traditions" about rent sharing.
Plugging these functional forms into the effort function (15) yields an explicit expression for effort
with Q ≡ θe α max /α. This relatively simple form is admittedly contingent on our maintained assumptions about preferences, technology and minimum/maximum effort. We, however, believe that a similar direct relationship between effort supply and the firm's gift would arise from alternative hypotheses. 29 We may be able to work out this result from indirect utility calculations.
Firms
Firms are homogenous. Contrary to workers, non-materialistic considerations of reciprocity do not enter into their objective function. However, they understand workers' effort function and internalize the effect of their employment and wage decision on effort. Cost minimization thus implies the same type of labor demand and MSCas derived in Section 2; (5) and (6), respectively. We repeat these formulae here for the sake of convenience w = ψf n (1 + ε e,n ) 1 = ε e,w − ε e,n .
Even though the EC applying to these conditions is more involved than in the case of the reduced-form effort function in Section 2, the following closed-form solutions for these two equations can be derived (via the implicit function theorem):
where we defined e θ ≡ (θ − α) and
The reader is referred to the appendix for details on these derivations.
Furthermore, denotingθ = e θ/ ≈ θ, we can combine the MSC (18) and the EC above (17) to compute the following wage setting curve
We call this expression the Fair Wage Function (FWF) because it stipulates the wage the firm pays in order to elicit optimal effort. Note that this wage is increasing in both the firms' productivity y/n and the workers reservation wage b. As Figure 5 depicts, our explicit model therefore implies a downward-sloping wage-setting curve as in the reduced-form case in Section 2 with internal references.
The equilibrium of this model is The calculations are explained in detail in the appendix. The equilibrium of our model is entirely determined by parameters that have a clear structural interpretation.
Comparative statics
To compare the quantitative implications of our reciprocity-based model with the reduced-form models from Section 2, we proceed by examining the comparative statics with respect to a flexible price technology shock and a fixed price demand shock. The benchmark equilibrium of the model is defined by the FWF, the EC, the labor demand (17) , the production function (16) and the condition that b = ρw. We determine the endogenous variables e, w, b, y, ϕ as functions of γ,θ, ρ, n, ψ, α, A (see the appendix for detailed explanations). Contrary to the reduced-form models of Section 2, calibration of this equilibrium is straightforward because our reciprocitybased model is entirely determined by parameters that have a clear structural interpretation. As before, we set α = 0.6, ψ = 0.9, A = 1, ρ = 0.5 and 1 − n = 0.05.
Furthermore, we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion at γ = −2, and the curvature parameter of the disutility of effort to θ = 2. The weight ϕ in the definition of the reference wage resulting from these values is 0.49 and the implied labor income share is wn/y = 0.58.
Flexible price productivity shock
The second row of Table 3 displays the general equilibrium responses of our reciprocitybased model to a decrease the productivity variable A by 1%, given flexible prices and b held constant at its benchmark equilibrium level. Output is supply determined and the markup remains constant. In conformity with what was obtained with the internal reference reduced-form model in Section 2, the reaction of both employment and output is almost 2.5 times as large as the size of the productivity shock itself.
Figure 7a displays this situation. Also as before, none of the other aggregates (effort, wage, markup, labor productivity, net profits) vary. The firm finds it optimal to react to the increase in total factor productivity with an increase in employment while leaving all other variables constant. The similarity to the reduced-form case is striking.
Fixed price aggregate demand shock
The third row of Table 3 reports the responses to a negative 1% shock in demand y, keeping prices fixed. Effective labor needs to decrease by 1% to match this reduction in demand. Firms thus reduce employment, which results in an increase in the labor productivity and thus the reference wage. Figure 7b illustrates this response graphically.
Contrary to the reduced-form models in Section 2, firms in our reciprocity-based model find it optimal to increase wages by a smaller amount (0.10%) and allow part of the increase in the reference wage to translate into an decrease in its gift, thus eliciting lower effort (−0.08%). This explains why the reaction of employment, labor productivity and the markup is slightly more muted than in the reduced-form model with internal references. Overall, the results are the same as before: great wage rigidity together with large movements in employment and output.
The comovement between effort and output is interesting. It is explained by the fact that in equilibrium, effort is negatively related to the markup 1/ψ. Given that the markup is countercyclical over the cycle in the case of demand-led expansions, the internal reference model presented here thus offers an alternative to Burnside and Eichenbaum's (1996) labor hoarding story for why effort is procyclical.
A second interesting result coming out of this experiment is that the real wage is mildly countercyclical with respect to the demand shock (similar to what we found for the reduced-form internal reference model in Section 2). This result is consistent with a number of recent econometric studies using structural vector autoregressions to investigate about the cyclicality of macroeconomic aggregates to supply and demand shocks. Based on different identification schemes, Blanchard
[1989], Gamber and Joutz [1997] and Fleischman [1999] all report that there is a small negative correlation between real wages and cyclical indicators conditional on demand shocks.
Beyond the static framework
To be useful in organizing our thinking about empirical observations, our modelling must be extended beyond the confines of a purely static framework. While a full treatment in a dynamic context exceeds the scope of this paper, we explore here some of the issues and implications involved in taking our reciprocity-based model into a dynamic environment.
Recall the above definition of the firm's gift to the worker
We define w r ≡ [ϕ(y/n) γ + (1 − ϕ)b γ ] as the reference wage, with the weight ϕ determining what workers consider as a "fair split" between minimum and maximum compensation. Translated into a dynamic environment with complete information, this reference wage would depend on the time-varying quantities y t /n t and b t . 30 However, firm earnings per worker are unlikely to be known by the worker at the time of the wage negotiation if only because at that moment, i.e. at the beginning of a given period, production has not yet taken place. It is therefore natural to hypothesize that what the worker views as the maximum wage offer for period t takes the form of an expectation based on the information available up to the end of period t − 1; i.e. E t−1 (y t /n t ). A somewhat different point applies to the reservation wage.
If workers consider unemployment benefits as the relevant minimum compensation level, b t is known in advance and defined as a fraction (the replacement ratio) of last period's wage; i.e. b t = ρw t−1 . A similar proportionality between b t and past wages could be due to workers' habit persistence as highlighted by some of the studies discussed above. 31 Under these quite natural assumptions, the dynamic version of the worker's effort function takes the form
, with worker's reference wage being defined as w r t ≡ [ϕ(E t−1 (y t /n t )) γ +(1−ϕ)(ρw t−1 ) γ ]. This wage reference can also be considered as the workers' wage aspiration -a term commonly used in the literature.
What is the firm's optimal wage setting decision in this dynamic context? The answer to this question depends on whether we consider our economy as one of high worker mobility or not. In the high mobility case -or the "social norm" case to use Becker's [1996] terminology -firms take E t−1 (y t /n t ) and w t−1 as exogenous variables in their current wage setting decision. Workers are thus implicitly assumed to stay for only one period with their employer. The alternative -or the "personal norm" case -is that workers stay in the same job for long periods of time. Under this scenario, firms internalize the positive effect that current productivity and current wages have on workers' future wage references.
For the sake of simplicity, we only consider the social-norm case here. 32 The first-order conditions to the firm's cost minimization with respect to labor and wage 30 We implicitly assume in our discussion that the weight ϕ remains constant over the business cycle. The constancy of this weight embodies the idea suggested by micro surveys that workers have little notion of how high their share of the firm's gross profit should be. Rather, once a split is established, tradition by itself makes it the standard of wage reference calculation. 31 In this case, the proportionality factor ρ may be a function of the unemployment rate as suggested by some of the aforementioned evidence. 32 The personal-norm case results in more difficult first-order conditions but with essentially the same qualitative implications for wage setting than the ones for the social-norm case discussed be-become, respectively w t = αψ y t n t n t = αψ y t e t ∂e t ∂w t .
Even though workers have internal references, the behavior of the firm in the socialnorm case is therefore similar to the external reference case discussed in Section 2. Optimal wage setting is described by the standard Solow Condition ε e,w = 1 and using the definition of the effort function above, the FWF implies the following relation for the current wage 33
withθ = e θ/ ≈ θ as before.
A number of comments are in order about this wage setting equation. First, the higher the expectations of current productivity E t−1 (y t /n t ), the higher the reference wage (the worker's wage aspiration) and thus the higher the wage offer by the firm.
In turn, it follows from the labor demand condition that the more these expectations exceed realized period t productivity, the lower the employment level. The Second, our dynamic FWF explains why in situations of low profit, pay cuts can occur and do not have the harmful effects described in many of the field studies discussed above. As long as firms can convince employees that wage decreases are low. However, the differences in functional form may matter quantitatively for estimation exercices. 33 Note that effort is still variable in this case and that the conclusions about wage rigidity of the previous section continue to hold.
necessary to prevent closing or to save a large number of jobs (i.e. E t−1 (y t /n t ) is sufficiently low), the wage reference adjusts downward and workers provide high effort even though they are paid less. Furthermore, these studies do not lend any role to labor productivity in the wage setting process. Our dynamic extension presented here results in a more structural and richer framework that can be calibrated using plausible micro-data and long-run averages.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the missing wage rigidity in general equilibrium of efficiency wage models is an artifact of the external wage reference perspective conventionally adopted by the literature. Efficiency wage models based on an internal wage reference perspective are capable of generating strong wage rigidity. Intuitively, this result arises because according to the internal perspective, workers consider firm productivity as an important reference point for their effort decision. Given that productivity decreases in labor, the reference wage and thus the optimal wage decreases when the firm expands its labor force.
The question of whether the efficiency wage hypothesis is consistent with the acyclical behavior of real wages over the business cycle therefore boils down to whether the internal reference perspective is a relevant description of how workers and firms behave in reality. Based on empirical evidence from a variety of different economic disciplines, we argue that internal wage references are at least as important as external references. Furthermore, field studies and results from experimental 34 Similarly, Hall [2003b] specifies the bargained wage in a search and matching model as a function of past wages and finds that under this assumption, the model also generates labor market dynamics that are much more in line with the data.
economics suggest that one of the main reasons for the importance of internal ref-
erences is workers' propensity to reciprocate fair treatment by the firm in terms of wages with an equally fair amount of effort. Fairness in turn is a function of firm-internal pay traditions, the ability of the firm to pay, and the workers own past wage.
Based on this evidence, we thus propose a structural model of efficiency wages that is broadly consistent with the reported evidence on fairness in labor relations.
Our model provides a structural explanation for wage rigidity, procyclical effort and countercyclical wages in response to demand shocks. Furthermore, our model implies an optimal wage setting equation that depends on firm productivity (or workers' expectations thereof), the workers' past wage (because unemployment benefits are considered as the reservation wage or because workers display habit persistence) and possibly unemployment. Our model thus offers a new, structural explanation for why firm productivity should be a significant predictor of wage setting by firms. In fact, Blanchard and Katz [1999] argue that wage dynamics in the United States and Europe is well characterized by a function that links real wage growth to past labor share, labor productivity growth as well as the unemployment rate. The dynamic FWF above contains all of these ingredients. 35 According to Blanchard and Katz, estimates furthermore indicate that the effect of past labor share and labor productivity is small and insignificant in the U.S. while in most European countries, their effect is significant (negative for the labor share and positive for labor productivity). However, these findings seem to contradict the micro-estimates discussed above and are also put into question by Ball and Moffitt who report that labor productivity plays an important and signicant role for U.S.
wage dynamics. In any event, these results "...indicate the importance of a better understanding of the determinants of reservation wages and of the importance of firm-specific rents as opposed to external labor-market conditions in wage setting in both Europe and the United States" (conclusion of Blanchard and Katz). We believe that the more explicit treatment of wage setting and the determinants of the reference wage proposed here represents a first step towards answering this call. 35 Note that the unemployment rate enters as a determinant of the wage if we allowed the proportionality factor ρ to vary with the unemployment rate, as suggested previously.
A Appendix
This appendix details the solution and the computation of comparative statics for the three models presented in the main text. The three models are:
• Akerlof's reduced-form efficiency wage model with external wage reference;
• Akerlof's reduced-form efficiency wage model with internal wage reference;
• the Rabin-type explicit reciprocity-based efficiency wage model with internal wage reference.
A.1 Akerlof 's reduced-form model with external wage reference
The reduced-form effort condition (EC) of Akerlof's efficiency wage model is given
where the reference wage w r is defined as
The bar variablesw andn denote average, economy-wide real wage and employment and b is the level of unemployment benefits. Firms consider all of these three variables as exogenous in their calculations.
The monopolistically competitive firms use technology
and minimize costs subject to satisfying the demand y while taking into account the
The first order conditions are
where ψ denotes real marginal cost, or the inverse of markup of the firms price over nominal marginal cost. 36 Dividing (23) by (24), we obtain the Solow condition (SC) ∂e ∂w w e ≡ ε e,w = 1, which implies for the above EC e = γa 1 µ w w r ¶ γ .
Combining the EC with this expression for the SC, we obtain the following optimal wage condition given w r w w r =
Finally, substituting this ratio into the EC, we get that optimal effort is a constant (in the sense of being unrelated to the equilibrium level of variables such as employment or the markup)
A.1.2 Equilibrium
To compute the equilibrium of Akerlof's model with external wage reference, we need to impose that in aggregate w =w and n =n. The optimal wage equation from above becomes
We call this equation the fair wage function (FWF).
The equilibrium values of e, w, b, y given values for γ,a 1, ρ, n, ψ, α, A are then computed from the five following equations: the production function (22) , labor demand (23), the FWF (26), the EC (25) and the equilibrium condition b = ρw.
First, rewrite the FWF as
.
and impose b = ρw, which lets us compute the ratio a 0 /(1 − γ)
36 In perfect competition, nominal marginal cost must equal the price level and hence ψ = 1.
In situations of monopolistic competition, however, firms charge prices as a markup over nominal marginal cost, i.e. ψ < 1. Hence, ψ is a measure of the degree of competition in the economy.
From this expression, we can pin down equilibrium effort via the EC
Finally, the equilibrium wage, unemployment benefits and production are obtained from
A.1.3 Flexible price response to a productivity shock
We compute the response to a productivity shock A, keeping b fixed at its equilibrium value (as computed above), as follows. 
Dividing (27) by (28), we obtain ε e,w − ε e,n = 1 which we call the modified Solow condition (MSC).
To compute the elasticities of the MSC, we rewrite the EC above as an implicit function, replacing labor productivity in the reference wage with y/n = Ae α n α−1 
Plugging this equation into the EC, we obtain that effort is again constant, as in the external wage reference version above e = −a 0 + a 0 (1 − γ(1 − ϕ))
A.2.2 Equilibrium
The internal wage reference version of Akerlof's efficiency wage model contains one additional parameter, ϕ. In the computation of the equilibrium, we can no longer .
Once we take into account of optimal wage setting by the firm, labor demand implies proportionality between w and y/n, as in the external wage reference model above.
The only difference is that the right-hand-side is multiplied by 1/[1 − ϕ(1 − α)].
Next, we combine this expression with the FWF to eliminate y/n w = This expression allows us to compute the equilibrium value of ϕ from the parameters γ,a 0 , a 1, ρ, ψ, α.
Given ϕ, computing the equilibrium values of e, y, w, b is straightforward.
A.2.3 Flexible price response to a productivity shock
Under flexible prices (i.e. ψ remains exogenous) and for b fixed at its equilibrium value, a change in productivity A neither affects w, nor y/n, nor e. This can be easily seen from the above formulas for w, labor demand and the EC. With y/n and e unchanged, we can compute the new equilibrium value of n from the production function.
A.2.4 Fixed price response to a demand shock
Since effort is constant, the effect on n of a fixed price demand shock can be readily calculated from the production function. Next, we compute y/n and since b is again fixed at its equilibrium value, we can infer w from the FWF. Finally, ψ is calculated from the labor demand (31).
A.3 Reciprocity-based model with internal wage reference Note that in the derivations of Γ e and Γ n we kept the denominator constant because we consider the benchmark equilibrium value of y/n as a long run traditional reference point. 37 Plugging these two expressions into the MSC, we get
which can be combined with the EC to obtain the FWF, as an explicit function of the wage
The derivation of the elasticity ε e,n above is also useful to compute an explicit expression for the labor demand w = ψα 
A.3.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium in e, w, b, y, ϕ given values for γ,θ, ρ, n, ψ, α, A is computed from the 5 following equations: the production function(), the EC (), the FWF (32), the labor demand (33) and the condition that b = ρw. First, we substitute b by ρw in the labor demand equation w = ψα y n (1 − ϕ)(θ − α)ρ γ w γ + ϕ(θ − α − γ)(y/n) γ (1 − ϕ)(θ − α)ρ γ w γ + αϕ(θ − α − γ)(y/n) γ and rewrite this expression as wn y = ψα (1 − ϕ)(θ − α)ρ γ + ϕ(θ − α − γ)(wn/y) −γ (1 − ϕ)(θ − α)ρ γ + αϕ(θ − α − γ)(wn/y) −γ 37 None of the conclusions in the paper would be affected if we endogenized y/n in the denominator. In fact, but we would get even more wage rigidity. Now, use this expression to substitute out the y/n terms in the labor demand equation (33) . We obtain w = ψα
he equilibrium real wage w is a function of unemployment benefits b as well as α, γ, ψ, θ, but not of productivity A. Since we keep b constant (and the markup ψ remains at its optimal level under flexible prices), the real wage is unaffected by a shock to productivity A. Likewise, we infer from the FWF and the EC that neither y/n nor e are affected by A as long as b is constant. Finally, we can compute the effect on labor using the production function n = · y n 1 Ae α¸1 α−1
A.3.4 Fixed price response to a demand shock
Computing the effects of a change in demand y, keeping prices fixed and b constant, is more complicated since it involves a change in the inverse of the markup ψ.
We proceed as follows. First, we take the FWF (32) and note that it implies w = w(y/n, b). But since y is given and b is kept constant, we can equivalently write w = w(n). Second, we use this function in the EC to express effort as e = e(w, y/n) = e(w(n), n) = e(n). Third, we use this expression for effort in the production function in order to solve for the new equilibrium level of n = n(y, e) = n(y, e(n)). With this new value of n at hand, we can then easily compute the new values of e, w, y/n and ψ.
